How then, asked the stone, can the hammerwielder who seeks to penetrate the heart of the universe be sure that there exist any interiors? Are they not perhaps fictions, these lures of interiors for rape which the universe uses to draw out its explorers?
Conrad refuses the sacred center in this way, he does so only by transvaluing its terms. The center is still there, only ever more darkly ambiguous. Again and again throughout the narrative, not to mention in the title itself, interiority is invoked: "The wilderness without a sound took him into its bosom again" (p. 34); "What was in there?" (p. 38); "the lurking death, to the hidden evil, to the profound darkness of its heart" (p. 47). A few examples suffice. Nevertheless, if the narrative presents a deeper and deeper journey into an interior, there are certain decisive moments when the very representation of interiority is itself radically threatened. Indeed, such a moment occurs on the first occasion that Marlowe attempts to represent the coast of Africa.
The first sighting of the African coast is foreshadowed by Marlowe's suggestion that his will be a venture not only to the center of a continent but also to the "center of the earth" (p. 18 ). Yet, at the very edge of the unknown world, at the moment of penetration, Marlowe discovers that the limits of the familiar landscape are likewise the limits of language and privileged perception. More than anything else, Africa presents itself from the outset as an epistemological problem. Marlowe's relation to the landscape is reduced to that of a spectator to the remote spectacle: "I watched the coast" (p. 19). As he gazes, however, the coast resists his questing eye as an enigma resists knowledge. Penetration by the eye is defeated by the strangeness and density of the landscape. The coast is evoked, not as a tangible, real world, with booming surf and a full array of colors and impressions, but rather, as a world of extreme deprivation and unreality. In the descriptions that follow, there is a struggle that goes beyond the question of perception and involves the very stuff of language itself. If Marlowe's gaze is impoverished and deprived, the failure of perception, and, simultaneously, of penetration, is revealed to be the triumph of the inexpressible. Africa is both protean and "featureless" (p. 19) because it has withdrawn beyond the horizon of known language.
If the coastline conjures up a string of epithets ("smiling, frowning, inviting, grand, mean, inspired, savage" [p. 19]), they are merely opposites, canceling each other as they arise, and so leaving the landscape as enigmatic and monotonous as before. It is a coast without qualities: "featureless," "formless," "uniform," "monotonous" (p. 19) . If the jungle can be said to have color, it is "so dark green as to be almost black" (p. 19) , that is, almost voided of color. The white surf is merely its irreducible opposite. If the sea is blue, its glitter (always a sinister word for Conrad) is threatened with imminent dissolution in a "creeping mist" (p. 19) . No boundary within which the land can be contained and domesticated is allowed to be final. There is an utter failure to obtain "a particularized impression" (p. 21).
The larger narrative events are equally hedged about by qualifications and modals: "perhaps," "presumably," "almost," "as though," "seemed" (p. 19 ). The use of "seemed" three times in the paragraph insists that what judgments there are in fact remain tenuous and provisional and implies in turn that the qualities and events described originate in subjective perception, and thus that they cannot claim status as objective features of the external world. Marlowe's comment that, "Every day the coast looked the same, as though we had not moved" (p. 19), conjures the dreadful possibility implicit in the entire description: that appearances radically may belie the true state of affairs and that an unbridgeable gap exists between the perception of a thing and its innermost essence.
In this way, the coast offers the first intimation of that "density" of the world which Camus describes as the climate of the absurd.15 If the landscape is impermeable both to language and to understanding, this very impenetrability strikes at the heart of the mythology of interiority. The subject is condemned to a sense of the resistance of the world and of the utter deprivation of truth. As Marlowe despairingly notes, "the malign somberness of the coast, seemed to keep me away from the truth of things" (p. 19). Nevertheless, the sequence ends, and Marlowe enters Africa proper with a return to interiority: "At last we opened up a reach" (p. 20). One has here the beginnings of a contradiction which is to become more intractable as the narrative progresses. Almost as if the threat of impenetrability that the landscape poses to Marlowe is too great, he transfers it back to the landscape itself. By a subtle defensive measure, moreover, he interprets it as the inherent hostility of the wilderness itself: "all along the formless coast was bordered by dangerous surf, as if Nature herself had tried to ward off intruders" (p. 20). In other words, the failure to describe is projected as a quality in nature itself, while, in the meantime, nature has become anthropomorphized and invested with malign intention, a calculated hostility. The banks themselves become imbued with Marlowe's transferred impotence, writhing "in the extremity of an impotent despair" (p. 21). This will be revealed later as one of Marlowe's most frequent strategies in his fraught confrontation with the landscape. At the same time, it marks the crossing over from one representation of landscape as featureless, indifferent, and impenetrable, to another that contradicts it, where the landscape is anthropomorphized, animate, and harbors within the recesses of its being a hostile intention.
In this description of the African coast Marlowe is reenacting what has become a recurrent, almost ritualistic, moment in the colonial narrative: the moment of verbal and visual crisis as the colonial intruder stands dumb-founded before an inexpressible landscape. This moment initiates what Wayne Franklin has called "the discovered plot of colonial life." This is "not the grand plot of idealized experience, the easy passage through a strange place, but rather the steady attrition of all such formulas, the slow accumulation of a knowledge won at great expense."16 The effort to give voice to a landscape that is unspeakable because it inhabits a different history creates a deep confusion, a kind of panic which can be warded off only by adopting the most extreme of defensive measures.
It is in this sense, and at such moments, that the colonial writer can be called a true precursor of the modern. What one witnesses in Marlowe's fraught description of the African coastline is what Barthes has called "the tragic element" in moder writing. That is to say, "history puts into [the modern writer's hands] a decorative and compromising instrument, a writing inherited from a previous and different history, for which he is not responsible and yet which is the only one he can use."17 Having traveled too far and too suddenly beyond the limits of tradition, the colonial writer discovers a landscape that is still unbaptized. It is drained of meaning because there is no inherited language which can rightfully give it tongue. It withdraws to a distance. It does not conjure from within the writer any familiar allusions, topoi, or habits of speaking, because its history is incommensurate with the colonial's history. Henceforth, the colonial "has to live in the midst of the incomprehensible, which is also detestable" (p. 9). Every attempt to describe the landscape, to draw it near, reveals only the failure of language to find out its essence, to penetrate its innermost heart. The writer thus discovers that the inherited language is attended by "ancestral and all-powerful signs which, from the depths of a past foreign to him, impose Literature on him like a ritual, not like a reconciliation" (Barthes, p. 86). Having made this discovery, the writer can never tackle a landscape without at certain moments being "referred back, by a sort of tragic reversal, to the sources, that is to say, the instruments of creation" (Barthes, p. xvi). This moment may be repressed, but the mark of repression will be conspicuous.
This intimate relation between the encounter with a strange continent and the tragic reversal to the sources of creation is illustrated very early in Heart of Darkness. The anonymous narrator suggests that Marlowe's difference from the ordinary seamen lies in the fact that he "did not represent his class" (p. 8). Marlowe himself cautions the Company doctor from too confidently taking his measure, by warning him that he "was not in the least typical" (p. 17). He thereby identifies himself as one of those exiles and emigres whose liminal position in society throws up more starkly the verbal consequences of historical dislocation. The narrator describes Marlowe as refusing the center as a metaphor both for the penetration of a tale and for that of a continent, which the ordinary seamen are said to endorse. To Marlowe, the meaning of an episode does not lie within the tale like a kernal "within the shell of a cracked nut" (p. 8). Rather, it "envelops the tale which brought it out only as a glow brings out a haze, in the likeness of one of those misty halos that sometimes are made visible by the spectral illumination of moonlight" (p. 8). Yet it is telling here that the center has not been resisted fully; it merely has been inverted and obscured.
The tragic referral to the problem of language afflicts Marlowe at a number of critical moments in his telling. At these moments, a turbulence occurs in the narrative as his distraught voices surface to confess his literal loss for words, "How shall I define it?" (p. 92); or the impossiblity that his words can cover the distance in experience which separates him from his listeners, "No use telling you much about that" (p. 28); or, quite simply, to convey the intractable difficulty of what he knows, "it was impossible to tell" (p. 31). This last quotation, "it was impossible to tell," itself carries a burden of ambiguity which implies both a failure of understanding and a failure of language. ment it speaks, the moment it attempts to capture its condition in words, "this world cracks and tumbles: an infinite number of shimmering fragments" (Camus, p. 24). In other words, the absurd begins at that moment when the rational word attempts to grasp and to contain a world which is suddenly discovered to be but a "vast irrational" (Camus, p. 31). More severely, if before "thought had discovered in the shining mirrors of phenomena eternal relations capable of summing them up and summing themselves up in a single principle" (Camus, p. 23), the vanishing of these mirrors, the collapse of mimesis, provokes a crisis which goes beyond the problem of expressibility and threatens the essential identity of the subject itself. It becomes possible to contemplate the fact that another being may remain forever unknown, and that there is "in him something irreducible that escapes us" (Camus, p. 17). More than this, one becomes a stranger to oneself.
Similarly, if Marlowe is stricken by his inability to interpret the landscape, this failure occasions the infinitely more severe crisis of not knowing who he and his companions were themselves: "What were we who had strayed in here?" (p. In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus gives eloquent expression to a travail in the modern mind quite similar in its essentials to this crisis in the colonial narrative. If, as Jonathan Crewe has suggested, in this way "the colonial writer is merely a special case of the European writer, and his predicament in the modern age is in some ways only an exaggeration and a portent of the European writer's predicament," then an inquiry into this shared predicament may perhaps most profitably begin by placing Conrad more explicitly alongside Camus, whom he anticipated by forty years. 18 The absurd begins for Camus when the world evades for a moment the attempt to reduce it to the human. All thought is inherently anthropomorphic. Understanding the world is nothing other than "reducing it to the human, stamping it with his seal" (Camus, p. 20). When for a moment the world escapes the illusory meaning with which it has been clothed, it becomes itself again, primitive and utterly strange. This is the intellectual malady called the absurd, when something inhuman is discovered to lie at the heart of all reality. At such a moment, "the primitive hostility of the world rises up to face us across millennia. For a second we cease to understand it, because for centuries we have understood in it solely the images and designs that we had attributed to it beforehand" (Camus, p. 20). Camus would have it that such moments "run through all literature and all philosophies" (Camus, p. 22). If this is so, and it is arguable, it almost certainly would seem that one has here not so much a psychological universal as a recurrent ideological trauma, historically occasioned, when a particular tradition of thought is brought face to face with conditions now discovered by historical change to be utterly unaccountable. In this regard, it is not surprising that the colonial landscape, facing the historical interloper in all its strangeness and inexpressibility, comes at certain moments to reveal, in flashes and intimations, that primitive hostility which is the preliminary to the absurd. This is Marlowe's plight, the impossibility of representing a landscape which has completely escaped all known ways of representing it. The degree to which it becomes "impossible to tell" now encompasses everything before him: "The earth seemed unearthly" (p. 51). This is much less a description of an attribute of the landscape than it is the expression of a failure to describe, of an acute verbal impasse, coupled as it is with Marlowe's recognition that he must speak, whatever the cost. In "unearthly," as elsewhere in Conrad, the negative affix itself comes to carry a thematic value of its own, signaling that the world can be known and described only in terms of what it is not. The negative affix is a grammatical sign of the inscrutability of the universe and of a consequent failure of mimesis. The attribute "unearthly" is nothing more than a dialectical negation of its object "earth," and both are held together uneasily by the suggestion that even this may be mere appearance: "seemed." More suggestively, because the world has escaped language, it takes on an inimical and hostile appearance: "there you look at a thing monstrous and free" (p. 51). This is the discovery of the absurd, the discovery of to what degree the world is "so impenetrable to human thought, so pitiless to human weakness" (p. 79). Yet at this point, I suggest, one finds in Marlowe a resistance to the full implications of the absurd, one which initiates an alternative representation of the landscape and an attempt to return once more to interiority.
At the moment of the absurd, "strangeness creeps in: perceiving that the world is 'dense,' sensing to what degree a stone is foreign and irreducible to us, with what intensity nature or a landscape can negate us" (Camus, p. 20) . There are two notions implicit in this statement. At such a moment, the fiction of interiority collapses. The world no longer encloses a secret meaning, but becomes impenetrable to human thought and, therefore, meaningless. More than this, the trauma provoked by this collapse of the ancient center is projected back onto the landscape itself, becoming invested in it as a "primitive hostility," a malignity capable of negating the human who faces it. Here one has the return to anthropomorphism. Such a moment was prefigured in Marlowe's first confrontation with the African coast. A considerably more severe collision with the "density" of the world is enacted when Marlowe is barely eight miles from Kurtz, paradoxically, that is, at the very moment of penetrating the Inner Station. Dusk falls, preventing further passage, and Marlowe pulls into the center of the stream. What follows is so striking that it may be quoted in full:
The reach was narrow, straight, with high sides like a railway cutting. The dusk came gliding into it long before the sun had set. The current ran smooth and swift, but a dark immobility sat upon the banks. The living trees, lashed together by the creepers and every living bush of the undergrowth, might have been changed into stone, even to the slenderest twig, to the lightest leaf. It was not sleep-it seemed unnatural, like a state of trance. Not the faintest sound of any kind could be heard. You looked on amazed, and began to suspect yourself of being deaf-then the night came suddenly, and struck you blind as well. About three in the morning some large fish leapt, and the loud splash made me jump as though a gun had been fired. When the sun rose, there was a white fog, very warm and clammy, and more blinding than the night. It did not shift or drive; it was just there, standing all around you like something solid. At eight or nine perhaps, it lifted as a shutter lifts. We had a glimpse of a towering multitude of trees, of the immense matted jungle, with the blazing little ball of the sun hanging over it-all perfectly still-and then the white shutter came down again, smoothly, as if sliding in greased grooves.... An empty stream, a great silence, an impenetrable forest" (p. 48) . "There was no joy" in the sunshine, only a sense of great loss, a loss of memories, bear-ings, and senses. This is to say that the plenitude of jungle life only conceals a formlessness deeply hazardous to the explorers. And overshadowing it all is the silence and the realization that this silence "did not in the least resemble a peace. It was the stillness of an implacable force brooding over an inscrutable intention. It looked at you with a vengeful aspect.... The inner truth is hiddenluckily, luckily. But I felt it all the same; I felt its mysterious stillness watching me . .." (p. 49) .
The colonial intruder who cannot find words to fit the landscape stands in a world gone suddenly quiet. The silence of the Congo jungle embodies in this way both Marlowe's own sense of the inexpressible and his resulting panic at having been deprived of truth and meaning. As Camus expresses it, the absurd is born in this confrontation between the human urge toward unity and reason and "the unreasonable silence of the world" (p. 32). The absence that silence signifies is the absence of meaning, and the absence of meaning for Marlowe is so calamitous that it is seen at moments as capable of threatening the mind with extinction:
We stopped, and the silence driven away by the stopping of our feet flowed back again from the recesses of the land. The merging of jungle and African is given fullest expression in the depiction of Kurtz's lover, as Marlowe repeats an almost incantatory formula by which they are equated. Earlier the wilderness was evoked as "an implacable force brooding over an inscrutable intention" (p. 48). Now, in almost identical terms, Kurtz's consort has an "air of brooding over an inscrutable purpose" (p. 87). In mating with her, Kurtz has literally mated with those "forgotten and brutal instincts" (p. 94) that Africa is now seen to embody. Africa is itself the purest expression of those "primitive emotions" (p. 98) that lie dormant within rational man as the psychic residue of a primitive past now dangerously awakened from its slumber. Again one witnesses a displacement. The recognition of remote kinship that the African frenzy inspires in Marlowe is projected back to the landscape: "the immense wilderness, the colossal body of the fecund and mysterious life seemed to look at her, pensive, as though it had been looking at the image of its own tenebrous and passionate soul" (p. 87). It is much more the case, however, that rational man is being fully challenged here to peer into his own "creepy thoughts" (p. 53).
What Marlowe presents us in this glimpse into psychic uproar is much less an attribute of any approximate African culture than a projection onto the African of a condition of extreme trauma that is, more properly speaking, a feature of the colonial mind. Throughout Heart of Darkness, the shape of the colonial experience seems to erupt from the jungle itself, and now much more catastrophically from the "not inhuman" (p. 51) Africans who embody its inner truth. Africa is revealed to be dangerous because the colonial is there delivered to a world where anything can happen. It is, as the manager says, "Anythinganything can be done in this country" (p. 46). At this point one profitably can recall Camus one final time. The absurd "all started out from that indescribable universe where contradiction, antinomy, anguish or impotence reins" (Camus, p. 28). In other words, it begins with the collapse of mimesis, where the failure of representation delivers the mind to an unintelligible and limited universe. In this universe, "man's fate henceforth assumes its meanings. A horde of irrationals has sprung up and surrounds him until his ultimate end" (Camus, p. 26). That is to say, the question of the absurd begins with the collapse of mimesis and ends with the full irruption of the irrational into the conscious mind.
The undoubtedly racist depiction of the Africans in Heart of Darkness as primitive, irrational, and historically abandoned can in this sense be seen to be the overdetermined representation of historical coincidence: that of the emergence of the idea of the irrational in Western thought and the crisis of representation made most acute by the colonial predicament. By escaping representation, Africa literally presents the colonial mind with "a horde of irrationals" with which it must contend; at the same time, it presents it with a fictional arena in which it can dramatize for itself a crisis which is specifically Western. To a large extent, therefore, when Marlowe struggles with the "unfathomable enigma" (p. 60) of why the "cannibal" boatmen do not throw themselves upon him ("Why in the name of all the gnawing devils of hunger didn't they go for us?" [p. 59]), he is not surrendering simply to a popular racist misconception, but, much more importantly, he is asking that "fateful question" Freud was to ask soon after:
The fateful question for the human species seems to me to be whether and to what extent their cultural development will succeed in mastering the disburbance of their communal life by the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction .... Men have gained control over the forces of nature to such an extent that with their help they would have no difficulty in exterminating one another to the last man. 20 In other words, what inner restraint may prevent the Western mind from going ashore "for a howl and a dance" (p. 52)? It is in this sense that Marlowe finds the psychological "uproar" of Africa ugly: "Ugly. Yes, it was ugly enough" (p. 51). It is the simultaneously fascinated and revulsed recognition with which his fictional contemporary, Dr. Jekyll, was to greet his image in the mirror: "When I looked upon that ugly idol in the glass, I was conscious of no repugnance, rather of a leap of welcome. This, too was myself."21 Both Marlowe and Jekyll represent that moment when, for a number of historical reasons, the irrational can no longer be held underground. As Dr. Jekyll sums it up: ". .. the lower side of me, so long indulged, so recently chained down, began to growl for licence" (Stevenson, p. 446).
In conclusion, I would argue that the darkly ambiguous landscape of Heart of Darkness bears the traces of a profound ideological dilemma. It would appear that Conrad denounces the atrocity inflicted on the Congo African as a specifically historical atrocity inflicted on a morally innocent people. In order to do so, he exposes the fiction of colonizers as the harbingers of light by inverting the sacred quest. In effecting this representation, however, he commits himself to an ideology of interiority which is itself attended by certain ideological consequences. These consequences are gradually revealed to be in fraught contradiction with the emergent landscape of the absurd thrown up both by the colonial experience and by the failure of mimesis. The full implications of the absurd are in turn resisted by a return to interiority and the projection of the irrational onto the Africans. In the process, as Francis B. Singh has noted, "the darkness first associated with the west gets reassociated with Africa."22 This appears to be in part an inescapable consequence of ideological conflict between the idea of interiority and the absurd, a fraught defensive measure against an intractable impasse. Indeed, as Conrad was himself to admit, "It will be a long time before we have learned that in the great darkness before us, there is nothing that we need fear."23 It is in this sense, then, that the Congo of Heart of Darkness is a country of the mind, a dream-world colonized for western literature where the late nineteenth-century, waking from its dream of the Crystal Palace, could begin to contend with the horde of irrationals springing up around it. Finally, then, if one is to restore Heart of Darkness to its historical moment, less attention should be paid to the "reflection" of certain local historical and biographical facts in the book than to the necessarily much more difficult task of accounting historically for the ideological trauma that scars Heart of Darkness.
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